Game-Theoretic Frameworks for the Techno-Economic Aspects of Infrastructure Sharing in Current and Future Mobile Networks

RÉSUMÉ Le phénomène de partage d’infrastructure dans les réseaux mobiles a prévalu au cours des deux dernières décennies. Il a pris de l’ampleur en particulier pendant les deux dernières migrations technologiques, à savoir de la 2G à la 3G et de la 3G à la 4G et il sera encore plus crucial à très court terme avec l’avènement de la 5G. En permettant aux Opérateurs de Réseaux Mobiles (ORM) de faire face à la demande croissante des utilisateurs et à la baisse des revenus. Il n’est pas rare non plus que le partage d’infrastructure s’accompagne du partage du spectre, une ressource essentielle et de plus en plus rare pour les réseaux mobiles. Dans ce milieu, la communauté des chercheurs, parmis d’autres, a étudié les multiples aspects techniques du partage d’infrastructure parfois associés au partage du spectre. Entre autres, ces aspects techniques comprennent l’évaluation des performances en termes de métriques de réseau, de gestion de ressources et d’habilitateurs et d’architectures adaptées. Les aspects économiques ont également été abordés, mais généralement en se concentrant étroitement sur l’estimation des économies de coûts des dfférentes alternatives de partage d’infrastructure. Cependant, lorsqu’on considère le problème du partage d’infrastructure, et le cas échéant aussi du partage du spectre du point de vue d’un ORM, qui est une entité intéressée à maximiser le profit, il est important d’évaluer non seulement la réduction des coûts de cette infrastructure, et le cas échéant aussi le partage du spectre, mais aussi leur impact sur les performances du réseau et par conséquent sur les revenus de l’ORM. De ce point de vue, la viabilité du partage d’infrastructure ne doit pas être prise pour acquise ; afin d’étudier le problème stratégique d’un ORM concluant un accord de partage avec un ou plusieurs autres ORM, les aspects techniques et économiques doivent être pris en compte. Cette étude constitue le premier objectif de ce projet de recherche doctorale. Plus précisément, nous avons considéré plusieurs variantes résultant de deux cas où chaque variante a été abordée par un modèle mathématique approprié. Ces variantes répondent à un scénario 4G commun dans lequel il existe un ensemble de ORM avec des parts de marché données qui coexistent dans une zone géographique urbaine dense ; chaque ORM doit décider s’il faut déployer une couche de petites cellules dans la zone et, le cas échéant, s’il doit le faire lui-même ou en concluant un accord de partage en créant un réseau partagé avec certains, ou la totalité, des autres ORM, auquel cas une coalition est créée. Une caractéristique commune importante de ces variantes est le modèle de tarification de l’utilisateur défini comme une fonction linéaire du taux moyen perçu par l’utilisateur en fonction de la coalition dont fait partie l’ORM de l’utilisateur.----------ABSTRACT The phenomenon of infrastructure sharing in mobile networks has been prevalent over the last two decades. It has gathered momentum especially during the last two technology migrations, i.e., from 2G to 3G and from 3G to 4G and it will be even more crucial with the advent of 5G. The key rationale behind such phenomenon is cost reduction as a means for Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) to deal with an increasing user demand but declining revenues. It is also not unusual for infrastructure sharing to go hand in hand with sharing of spectrum, an essential and increasingly scarce resource for mobile networks. In this milieu, the research community (but not only) has addressed multiple technical aspects of infrastructure sharing sometimes combined with spectrum sharing. Among others, such technical aspects include performance evaluation in terms of network metrics, resource management and enablers and adapted architectures. Economic aspects have been addressed as well, but usually with a narrow focus on estimating the cost savings of the di˙erent infrastructure sharing alternatives. However, from the perspective of an MNO, which is a self-interested, profit-maximizing entity, it is important to assess not only the cost reduction that infrastructure sharing, and when applicable, also spectrum sharing bring about, but also their impact on the network performance and consequently on the MNO’s revenues. From this perspective, the viability of infrastructure sharing should not be taken for granted; in order to study the strategic problem of an MNO entering a sharing agreement with one or multiple other MNOs, both technical and economic aspects should be taken into account – such study has been the first objective of this doctoral research project. We have specifically considered multiple variants arising from two cases where each variant has been tackled by an appropriate mathematical model. These variants address a common 4G scenario in which there is a set of MNOs with given market shares that coexist in a given dense urban geographical area; each MNO has to decide whether to deploy a layer of small cells in the area and if so, whether to do that by itself or by entering a sharing agreement, i.e., building a shared network with a subset or all other MNOs (in which case a coalition is created). One key common feature of these variants is the user pricing model which is defined as a linear function of the average rate perceived by the user depending on the coalition joined by the user’s MNO; such pricing model allows us to capture the impact that infrastructure sharing, and, when applicable, also spectrum sharing have on the MNO’s revenues through a network performance metric. In turn, the two key outcomes of the models tackling these variants are the set of coalitions and the number of small cells they deploy

On Optimal Infrastructure Sharing Strategies in Mobile Radio Networks

partially_open5noopenCano, Lorela; Capone, Antonio; Carello, Giuliana; Cesana, Matteo; Passacantando, MauroCano, Lorela; Capone, Antonio; Carello, Giuliana; Cesana, Matteo; Passacantando, Maur

A non-cooperative game approach for RAN and spectrum sharing in mobile radio networks

Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) are nowadays forced to continuously invest in their network infrastructure to keep up with the increasing bandwidth demand and traffic load coming from mobile users. In this context, MNOs have to face the strategic problem of whether to invest on their own or deploy shared networks. We address here the problem of Radio Access Network (RAN) and spectrum sharing in 4G mobile networks. Namely, we consider the case in which multiple MNOs are planning to deploy small cell Base Stations to improve their current network infrastructure; the deployment investment may be shared with other MNOs, thus giving rise to shared RANs. The RAN and spectrum sharing problem is formalized as a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem, where the strategy of each MNO in the game is twofold: selecting a coalition (whom to cooperate) and the fraction of the coalition cost to pay, with the goal of maximizing the individual return on investment. The proposed approach is leveraged to characterize the stable coalitions and their respective cost division policies for various network and economic conditions

A framework for joint resource allocation of MapReduce and web service applications in a shared cloud cluster

The ongoing uptake of cloud-based solutions by different business domains and the rise of cross-border e-commerce in the EU require for additional public and private cloud solutions. Private clouds are an alternative for e-commerce sites to host not only Web Service (WS) applications but also Business Intelligence ones that consist of batch and/or interactive queries and resort to the MapReduce (MR) programming model. In this study, we take the perspective of an e-commerce site hosting its WS and MR applications on a fixed-size private cloud cluster. We assume Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees must be provided to end-users, represented by upper-bounds on the average response times of WS requests and on the MR jobs execution times, as MR applications can be interactive nowadays. We consider multiple MR and WS user classes with heterogeneous workload intensities and QoS requirements. Being the cluster capacity fixed, some requests may be rejected at heavy load, for which penalty costs are incurred. We propose a framework to jointly optimize resource allocation for WS and MR applications hosted in a private cloud with the aim to increase cluster utilization and reduce its operational and penalty costs. The optimization problem is formulated as a non linear mathematical programming model. Applying the KKT conditions, we derive an equivalent problem that can be solved efficiently by a greedy procedure. The proposed framework increases cluster utilization by up to 18% while cost savings go up to 50% compared to a priori partitioning the cluster resources between the two workload types

On the evolution of infrastructure sharing in mobile networks: A survey

ABSTRACT: Infrastructure sharing for mobile networks has been a prolific research topic for more than three decades now. The key driver for Mobile Network Operators to share their network infrastructure is cost reduction. Spectrum sharing is often studied alongside infrastructure sharing although on its own it is a vast research topic outside the scope of this survey. Instead, in this survey we aim to provide a complete picture of infrastructure sharing both over time and in terms of research branches that have stemmed from it such as performance evaluation, resource management etc. We also put an emphasis on the relation between infrastructure sharing and the decoupling of infrastructure from services, wireless network virtualization and multi-tenancy in 5G networks. Such a relation reflects the evolution of infrastructure sharing over time and how it has become a commercial reality in the context of 5

Cooperative Infrastructure and Spectrum Sharing in Heterogeneous Mobile Networks

To accommodate the ever-growing traffic load and bandwidth demand generated by mobile users, mobile network operators (MNOs) need to frequently invest in high spectral efficiency technologies and increase their hold of spectrum resources; MNOs have then to weigh between building individual networks or entering into network and spectrum sharing agreements. We address here the problem of radio access network and spectrum sharing in 4G mobile networks by focusing on a case when multiple MNOs plan to deploy small cell base stations in a geographical area in order to upgrade their existing network infrastructure. We propose two cooperative game models (with and without transferable utility) to address the proposed problem: for given network (user throughput, MNO market, and spectrum shares) and economic (coalition cost and mobile data pricing model) settings, the proposed models output a cost division policy that guarantees coalition (sharing agreement) stability

Modeling the Techno-Economic Interactions of Infrastructure and Service Providers in 5G Networks With a Multi-Leader-Follower Game

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Evaluating the performance of infrastructure sharing in mobile radio networks

This work considers the strategic situation which arises when Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) coexisting in a given geographical area have to decide whether to invest in new radio access technology and whether to share the investment (and the infrastructure) with other operators. We focus on heterogeneous networks (HetNet) where MNOs add a layer of small cells to their existing macro cells. We address such strategic scenario by proposing a Mixed Integer Linear Programming formulation of the infrastructure sharing problem which takes as input techno-economic parameters as the achievable throughput in different sharing configurations, the pricing models for the service offered to the end users and the expectations on the return on investment for the mobile operators, and returns as output the “best” infrastructure/investment sharing options for the MNOs. The proposed formulation is finally leveraged to analyze the dynamics involved in the infrastructure sharing process under different techno-economic conditions in realistic network scenarios

Modeling the techno-economic interactions of infrastructure and service providers in 5G networks with a multi-leader-follower game

The decoupling of infrastructure from services, which has been so far a mainstream paradigm in the computational and storage domain, is now becoming a paradigm also for mobile networks. Indeed, 5G must provide a variety of services with very diverse requirements, such as throughput, latency, or reliability, and decoupling infrastructure from service provisioning allows to deal with such heterogeneity. In this context, a new business model, involving two different stakeholders, Infrastructure Providers and Service Providers, has emerged. Besides addressing the technical issues, it is also important to study the economic feasibility and behavior of such new paradigm and the techno-economic interactions among the different stakeholders that play different roles in the mobile network market. In this paper, we propose a multi-leader multi-follower variant of the Stackelberg game to model the considered environment. The proposed model is then fed with realistic data and used to analyze the system behavior and the impact of the technological features of the stakeholders on their competitiveness